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Abstract 
Retroduction is a thought operation that has been investigated in 
a limited fashion in Information Systems (IS) research. Yet, it has 
the potential of reframing IS research because it can shed a new 
light on the study of causal mechanisms. In this paper, we call for 
a renewed effort in the use of retroduction in the study of IS 
phenomena. Specifically, we claim that IS researchers could 
retroduce causal mechanisms by leveraging Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA) counterfactual approach to 
causation. Preliminary insights are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
Retroduction is a thought operation that has been little 
investigated in Information Systems (IS) research. 
Notwithstanding this dearth of research, some IS scholars have 
endeavoured to move the field beyond the dominant paradigms 
of deductive (positivism) and inductive (interpretivism) logic. 
For example, in his seminal paper, Mingers (2004: 94-95) argues 
that retroduction is a thought operation “where we take some 
unexplained phenomenon and propose hypothetical mechanisms 
that, if they existed, would generate or cause that which is to be 
explained.” (Emphasis in original). Wynn & Williams (2012: 
799-800) instead argue that “retroduction is a mode of inference 
in which events are explained by postulating (and identifying) 
mechanisms which are capable of producing them.” On his part, 
Tsang (2014: 181) claims that “retroduction presents a logical 
argument explaining what properties must exist in order for the 
phenomenon of interest to exist and be what it is.” Tsang (2014) 
goes on arguing that, though retroducing mechanisms is 
problematic, there are four distinct types of retroduction, namely, 
overcoded, undercoded, creative and meta-retroduction. 
Overcoded retroduction occurs when the explanation is obvious 
from existing knowledge and, therefore, the mechanism that 
explains a phenomenon is retroduced either automatically or 
semi-automatically. Under-coded retroduction occurs when there 
are a number of potential mechanisms and the researcher’s task 
is to select the most plausible mechanism given the specific 
context under investigation. Creative retroduction instead is a 
more creative leap where researchers have to literally invent the 
mechanism because no suitable mechanisms exist. Finally, meta-
retroduction may result in paradigm shifts because it may call for 
re-inventing theoretical or methodological paradigms to ensure a 
closer fit (or alignment) between empirical observations and 
theoretical or methodological frameworks.  
More recently, Mingers and Standing (2017) have introduced the 
distinction between retrodiction and retroduction by arguing that 
the former explains diachronic mechanisms (or processes) 
occurring over time while the latter is a thought operation that 
discovers synchronic mechanisms that account for the emergence 
of phenomena at given moments in time. Far from being mutually 
exclusive, both retrodiction and retroduction should be used in 
concert “to give an overall account of causality as a braiding or 
intertwining of two forms – event causality and generative 
causality” respectively (Ibid: 176). 
Though IS scholars have made remarkable progress in their 
investigation of retroduction, there are some outstanding issues 
that deserve further scrutiny. For example, it is not clear whether 
retroduction should be conceptualised as a messy and creative 
process or rather a well-structured sequence of steps that mirrors 
the Describing, Retroducing, Eliminating, Identifying and 
Correcting (DREIC) methodology for theoretical research (Cf. 
Mingers & Standing, 2017: 176; 182). Likewise, it is not clear 
whether one should turn to retrodiction (and its associated 
techniques as described by Mingers and Standing, 2017: 176-
182) to study event (or diachronic) causality or rather use more 
traditional process-tracing techniques (Iannacci & Cornford, 
2017). The argument of this paper is straightforward. We argue 
that the reason why retroduction is still an uncharted territory in 
IS research is because there are too many, and, at times, 
conflicting conceptualisation of mechanisms. Following in the 
footsteps of Mingers and Standing’s (2017) recent argument, we 
claim that IS scholars should conceptualise mechanisms as 
systems of interacting parts rather than processes occurring over 
time. This systemic approach, in turn, will open up new vistas in 
IS research because it will focus IS research on relatively-stable 
arrangements of objects (or parts) that are individually necessary 
and jointly sufficient for achieving specific outcomes of interest. 
In the remainder of this paper, we attempt to shed some light on 
retroduction using a counterfactual approach which is after 
causes that are Insufficient but Necessary parts of more complex 
arrangements (or systems) that are Unnecessary but Sufficient 
(INUS) for achieving the outcome of interest. We draw on 
recently published research to corroborate our argument. The 
paper is structured as follows. After setting the scene in the 
Introduction, we discuss difference-making and production 
accounts of causality in Section 2. Section 3 develops some 
preliminary insights in the quest for generative mechanisms 
interweaving the QCA logic with the DREIC approach. 
2. Difference-making accounts vs. production accounts of 
causality 
The distinction between synchronic and diachronic causality 
recently introduced in the IS literature (Mingers and Standing, 
2017) mirrors a prior distinction between difference-making 
accounts and production accounts of causality (Illari and Russo, 
2014). While production accounts focus on the temporal process 
whereby the cause brings about the effect, difference-making 
accounts try to establish the causal relation between cause and 
effect by looking at whether the occurrence or non-occurrence of 
the cause makes a difference to the occurrence or non-occurrence 
of the effect (Ibid). Another way of distinguishing between these 
two types of causality is to draw on Mingers’ (2014: 76-78) 
earlier argument that diachronic causality is about the 
“diachronic chain of one event influencing the next” while 
synchronic causality focuses on the “synchronic relations that 
generate what actually happens at each event point.” In his 
influential essay, Brady (2008: 219) draws similar distinctions 
between manipulation approaches based on counterfactual or 
experimental designs (difference-making or effect-of-causes 
accounts) and mechanistic approaches revolving around the 
definition of mechanisms as capacities that “lead from the cause 
to the effect”, that is, “entities and activities organized such that 
they are productive of regular changes from start or set-up to 
finish or termination conditions” (production accounts or causes-
of-effects accounts). 
These two conceptualisations of causality, in turn, inform 
different conceptualisations of mechanisms. For example, 
Glennan (2002) has argued that mechanisms may be thought of 
as systems of interacting parts or, more simply, as processes, that 
is, sequences of events. Likewise, in his review of the concept of 
mechanism, Gerring (2008) has come up with several definitions 
of mechanisms ranging from mechanisms as pathways or 
processes (production accounts) to mechanisms as unobservable 
or easy-to-observe causal factors (difference-making accounts). 
Notwithstanding the variety of conceptualisations, Gerring 
(2008) has argued for a minimal (or core) definition of 
mechanisms as “pathways or processes by which an effect is 
produced” (Ibid: 177). Similarly, in his influential review of 
causal mechanisms, Mahoney (2001: 579-580) lists a glossary of 
definitions ranging from production accounts (e.g., 
“mechanisms... are analytical constructs that provide 
hypothetical links between observable events”) to difference-
making accounts (e.g., “a mechanism is a set of interacting parts 
- an assembly of elements producing an effect not inherent in any 
one of them”).  
The foregoing argument shows that retroduction is riddled with 
many conceptual ambiguities because it is about the discovery of 
underlying causal mechanisms which are difficult to define. In 
the following, we suggest a practical way forward that leverages 
new methodological developments in the IS scholars’ arsenal of 
tools. 
3. Preliminary insights on generative mechanisms 
Above, we have argued that the reason why IS scholars are yet to 
make substantial progress in the domain of “retroduction” is 
related to the ambiguous use of the concept of causal mechanism. 
We have also argued that one way to bypass this stalemate is to 
draw on recent conceptualisations of causal mechanisms that 
distinguish between synchronic and diachronic mechanisms. We 
now take stock of recent IS scholarship using QCA (or one of its 
variants such as fuzzy-set, crisp-set or multi-value QCA) to 
develop preliminary insights on retroductive thinking. 
In their recent study, Park et al. (2017) have explicitly used the 
word “retroduction” to refer to an iterative dialogue between 
theoretical ideas and empirical evidence (Ibid: 657). Drawing on 
the idea that there is a fundamental mismatch between methods 
and theories in the social sciences (Fiss, 2007), they have called 
for a paradigm shift. Specifically, they have called for a QCA set-
theoretic approach to bypass the assumptions of singular 
causation and linear relations. Accordingly, Park et al. (2017) 
have issued a call for meta-retroduction to ensure a closer fit (or 
alignment) between the empirical study of organisational 
configurations and the methodological assumptions of QCA. 
Park et al. (2017) have explicitly advocated that QCA reasoning 
is both deductive and inductive. It is deductive because causal 
relations are informed by prior theory. It is inductive because 
calibration (i.e., the coding of the cases at hand) revolves around 
the substantive knowledge of the empirical cases at hand (Ibid). 
Yet, Park et al. (2017) did not discuss how their retroductive 
reasoning relates to causal mechanisms.  
Fiss (2011), however, has made a ground-breaking case for 
showing the utility of the QCA approach in developing the theory 
of causal mechanisms in organisations. Challenging the 
assumption that “all parts of the configuration are equally 
necessary or important” (Ibid: 396), Fiss (2011) has come up with 
“a definition of coreness based on which elements are causally 
connected to a specific outcome” (Ibid: 398). More specifically, 
he defined “core elements as those causal conditions for which 
the evidence indicates a strong causal relationship with the 
outcome of interest. In contrast, peripheral elements are those for 
which the evidence for a causal relationship with the outcome is 
weak.” (Ibid: 398). Building on these ideas, Iannacci and 
Cornford (2017) have recently argued that core elements are 
necessary pre-requisites for achieving the outcome of interest. By 
contrast, peripheral elements are contingent factors that play a 
causal role in some contexts rather than other contexts.  
3.1 Interweaving the QCA logic with the DREIC approach 
Leveraging the insight that QCA can be used as a paradigm shift 
for developing a theory of causal mechanisms in organisations, 
we now suggest how one could apply the QCA logic as a 
methodology for theoretical research.  
The first step in QCA consists of breaking down the cases at hand 
in terms of theoretically-relevant configurations. Accordingly, 
based on an in-depth analysis of relevant literature, one can 
describe these cases as set-theoretic configurations of causal 
conditions. Once cases are conceptualised as theoretically-
relevant packages, one proceeds with their calibration by scoring 
cases’ set membership using an iterative dialogue between theory 
and empirical evidence (Ragin, 2000). Calibration enables 
scholars to locate cases in those configurations where their 
membership is greater than 0.5. At this stage, the analyst can 
achieve a more fine-grained description of the cases by 
producing a truth-table, that is, a table that lists all logically-
possible combinations of causal conditions both present and 
absent with their associated outcomes (Ibid). A truth table has 2k 
rows where K is the number of causal conditions. The empirical 
cases can then be assigned to these rows on the basis of their 
values for the causal conditions, with some rows containing 
many cases, some rows just a few, and some rows containing no 
cases at all. 
The second step uses counterfactual analysis as a retroductive 
strategy to propose hypothetical recipes (or causal 
configurations) that, if they existed, would lead to the outcome of 
interest. Essentially, at this stage, the analyst must decide 
whether to bar all empty rows (or remainders) from the analysis 
or include a few rows for counterfactual analysis. Ragin (2008) 
distinguishes between “easy” and “difficult” counterfactuals 
depending on whether they are in line with theoretical and 
substantive knowledge. By being consistent with existing 
knowledge, “easy” counterfactuals are more exacting than 
“difficult” counterfactuals and, therefore, they only enable a 
fraction of the pool of remainders for analysis. Conversely, 
“difficult” counterfactuals may not align with theory-guided 
hunches. As a methodology for theoretical research, QCA allows 
for three solutions, that is, three distinct combinations of causal 
conditions that are jointly sufficient for the outcome of interest. 
Complex solutions occur when analysts bar all remainders from 
their analysis. Instead, intermediate and parsimonious solutions 
entail the inclusion of “easy” and “difficult” counterfactuals 
respectively. Since the incorporation of counterfactuals produces 
simpler or shorter solutions, it follows that complex solutions are 
a subset of intermediate solutions which, in turn are a subset of 
parsimonious solutions (where all counterfactuals are being 
incorporated regardless of their plausibility).  
The third step consists of eliminating alternative competing 
hypotheses (Mingers and Standing, 2017). This step is related to 
step two when using QCA. Let us consider, for instance, Iannacci 
and Cornford’s (2017) study of causal configurations for a 
positive impact in the European Social Fund context. These 
scholars have discovered two configurations sufficient for 
positive impact. Both configurations exhibit common factors in 
terms of compatibility, comprehensiveness, currency and 
reliability. However, one configuration is characterised by 
automated monitoring systems whereas the other configuration 
exhibits manual systems that leverage the presence of a 
consistent set of indicators thanks to the “four-eye” principle. 
With the presence of six conditions (k=6), their truth table (or 
table of logical possibilities) features 26 rows (that is, 64 rows). 
Nevertheless, only a fraction of these rows would be populated 
with cases because of the small N. Accordingly, Iannacci and 
Cornford (2017) had to speculate about the outcome of these 
empty truth-table rows by proposing hypothetical configurations 
(or generative mechanisms) that, if they existed, would generate 
or cause the outcome of interest (this is the retroduction logic 
discussed in step two using counterfactual thinking). Potentially, 
all empty truth-table rows are candidates for the outcome of 
interest. Accordingly, Iannacci and Cornford (2017) had to 
decide whether to incorporate all empty rows in their analysis 
regardless of whether they entail “easy” or “difficult” simplifying 
assumptions or, more simply, allow for the incorporation of 
“easy” counterfactuals only. Though the incorporation of “easy” 
counterfactuals leads to more conservative solutions (labelled 
“Intermediate” solutions in the QCA lingo), these solutions 
effectively bar difficult counterfactuals from the analysis, thus 
eliminating alternative competing mechanisms. Table 1 shows 
the simplification process that Iannacci and Cornford (2017) 
have implicitly applied using the fsQCA software programme. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Inclusion of “easy” counterfactuals to arrive at 
Intermediate Solution 
 
In the fourth step, analysts must identify the correct mechanism. 
For example, Iannacci and Cornford (2017) have identified two 
mechanisms that are jointly sufficient for positive impact. 
Specifically, they have argued that the achievement of an 
efficient and effective monitoring process requires monitoring 
systems that collect a comprehensive and up-to-date range of 
indicators and that depend on reliable technologies with 
compatible communication protocols. Though this bundle of 
conditions lies at the core of their mechanisms, Iannacci and 
Cornford (2017) have identified more contingent (or peripheral) 
conditions depending on whether the monitoring system is fully 
automated or, alternatively, is still relying on manual 
verifications but based on consistent definitions of monitoring 
Country/Conf
iguration 
COMPR*cons*CUR*CO
MPT*REL*AUT 
COMPR*CONS*CUR*C
OMPT*REL*aut 
COMPR*CONS*CUR*CO
MPT*REL*AUT (Easy 
counterfactual) 
Austria 0.00 0.51 0.49 
England 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Flanders 0.49 0.25 0.25 
France 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Germany 0.75 0.25 0.25 
Greece 0.00 0.25 0.25 
Hungary 0.49 0.25 0.25 
COMPR*CUR*COMPT*REL*AUT COMPR*CONS*CUR*COMPT*REL 
Legend: COMPR= Comprehensiveness; CONS= Consistency; CUR= Currency; COMPT= Compatibility; 
REL= Reliability; AUT= Automation. Lower case= Absence; Upper case= presence 
data and indicators. Accordingly, in this fourth step, IS scholars 
can identify generative mechanisms as INUS configurations 
where the so-called cause is “an insufficient but necessary part of 
a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the 
result” (Ragin, 2008: 154). 
In the fifth and final step, IS scholars should correct scientific 
knowledge in the light of their (provisional) findings (Mingers 
and Standing, 2017). For example, Iannacci and Cornford (2017) 
have reappraised the causal and temporal influences 
underpinning the DeLone and McLean’s IS success model in the 
European Social Fund context (DeLone and McLean, 1992). On 
their part, Park et al. (2017) have reinvigorated a contingency-
theory approach in the study of organisational agility. More 
specifically, they have highlighted the role that Business 
Intelligence tools and Communication Technologies play in 
achieving organisational agility in different organisational and 
environmental contexts. 
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